Its most valuable asset is maybe Dostoevky’s relentess and brave pursuit of the underlying truths as opposed to morally acceptable but shallow shortcuts to ephemeral triteness bound to fade into historical oblivion.

To give you a rough outline of the scene where this monologue is set:

Raskolnikow, Dostoevky’s protagonist, is being slyly and cryptically interrogated by a policeman whom he knows through a mutual friend as to whether he might be the sought cuplrit in an unsolved murder case. He has brought this suspicion unto himself through somewhat erratic behaviour in the past, however his great intellect has so far served him well in evading the charges. The policeman thus brings up the topic of Raskolnikow’s theory of crime in an attempt to discover hidden clues that could lead to a concret case againt Raskolnikow. This theory has been published in a newspaper before butn now has been maliciously misquoted by the policeman in order to nudge Raskolnikow into the wanted direction.

Raskolnikow aims to dispel the unclarity surrounding his viewpoint:

“The only difference is that I don’t contend that extraordinary people are always bound to commit breaches of morals, as you call it. [...]

I simply hinted that an ‘extraordinary’ man has the right … that is not an official right, but an inner right to decide in his own conscience to overstep … certain obstacles, and only in case it is essential for the practical fulfilment of his idea (sometimes, perhaps, of benefit to the whole of humanity). [...]

Then, I remember, I maintain in my article that all … well, legislators and leaders of men, such as Lycurgus, Solon, Mahomet, Napoleon, and so on, were all without exception criminals, from the very fact that, making a new law they transgressed the ancient one, handed down from their ancestors and held sacred by the people, and they did not stop short at bloodshed either, if that bloodshed—often of innocent persons fighting bravely in defence of ancient law—were of use to their cause. It’s remarkable, in fact, that the majority, indeed, of these benefactors and leaders of humanity were guilty of terrible carnage.

In short, I maintain that all great men or even men a little out of the common, that is to say capable of giving some new word, must from their very nature be criminals—more or less, of course.

Otherwise it’s hard for them to get out of the common rut; and to remain in the common rut is what they can’t submit to, from their very nature again, and to my mind they ought not, indeed, to submit to it. [...]

I only believe in my leading idea that men are in general divided by a law of nature into two categories, inferior (ordinary), that is, so to say, material that serves only to reproduce its kind, and men who have the gift or the talent to utter a new word. There are, of course, innumerable sub-divisions, but the distinguishing features of both categories are fairly well marked.

The first category, generally speaking, are men conservative in temperament and law-abiding; they live under control and love to be controlled. To my thinking it is their duty to be controlled, because that’s their vocation, and there is nothing humiliating in it for them. The second category all transgress the law; they are destroyers or disposed to destruction according to their capacities. The crimes of these men are of course relative and varied; for the most part they seek in very varied ways the destruction of the present for the sake of the idea to step over a corpse or wade through blood, he can, I maintain, find within himself, in his conscience, a sanction for wading through blood—that depends on the idea and its dimensions, note that. [...]

But the same masses(that loathe them in the here and now) set these criminals on a pedestal in the next generation and worship them (more or less). The first category is always the man of the present, the second the man of the future. The first preserve the world and people it, the second move the world and lead it to its goal. Each class has an equal right to exist. In fact, all have equal rights with me—and vive la guerre éternelle—till the New Jerusalem, of course!”

Although many cross-references to various philosophical concepts can be found within this quote, most stunning is maybe the seemingly ancestral connection to Nietzsche’s idea of the “Übermensch”, the abstract concept that set itself the ideal of overcoming nihilism by way of placing all emphasis on the here-and-now, the life we currently lead.

Quoting wikipedia, “placing belief or faith in anything transcendent is nihilistic and would lead to the failure of man’s attempt to become Übermensch. The idea of God is a quiet temptation. In overcoming nihilism, man undergoes three phases:

• The immoralist phase: he dares the jump away from the Christian dogmas to a space without God but wonders how life without Him can be possible. He ‘balances over an empty space’.
• The free thinker phase: man is already fully aware of his freedoms and knows how to use them. He knows ‘I am free when I am with myself’.
• The Übermensch: lives according to the principles of his “Will to Power” which ends in complete independence :

“It is here and nowhere else that one must make a start to comprehend what Zarathustra wants: this type of man that he conceives, conceives reality as it is: it is strong enough for it—, it is not estranged or removed from it, it is reality itself and exemplifies all that is terrible and questionable in it, only in that way can man attain greatness…”

The concept of “Will to Power”, one that was unfortunately raped and instrumentalized beyond recognition by the Nazi-Regime of the 3rd Regime, further showcases the strong interrelations betweeen Nietzsche and the quoted monologue of Raskolnikow. Without wanting to spend too much time on developing the thoughts behind it, let us merely quote Nietzsche himself in discussing it:

“I do not speak to the weak: they want to obey and generally lapse into slavery quickly. In the face of merciless nature, let us still feel ourselves as merciless nature! But I have found strength where one does not look for it: in simple, mild, and pleasant p[eople], without the least desire to rule—and, conversely, the desire to rule has often appeared to me a sign of inward weakness: they fear their own slave soul and shroud it in a royal cloak (in the end, they still become the slaves of their followers, their fame, etc.). The powerful n[atures] dominate, it is a necessity, they need not lift one finger. Even if, during their lifetime, they bury themselves in a garden house!”

—Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachlass, Fall 1880

In these few sentences alone, the connections become very clear: The almost synonymical use of “weak” and “ordinary”, the necessity of moral ‘domination’ by the ‘Extra-ordinary’, lasty the willingness of the weak to ‘be dominated’.

(It is of vital importance when discussing these topics that we receive terms such as “domination” or “weak” as philosophical concepts, not as slurs or martial, menacing threats of physical or mental brutality.)

After establishing the relatedness, what are we to make of the centerpiece of Raskolnikow’s theory on crime? :

“All great men or even men a little out of the common, that is to say capable of giving some new word, must from their very nature be criminals”, and justifiably so.

While it is an unquestionable fact that all agents of change often face innumerable odds and daunting resistance when unleashing revolutionary concepts on their world, does this firstly, necessarily make them criminals, and, secondly, if so, should this be considered acceptable behaviour?

I believe that one of the most important factors we need to acknowledge when evaluating these questions are the political circumstances from which certain ‘revolutionary’ actions arise, draw their inspirations and maybe of greatest importance: in which they take place.

Neither Nietzsche nor Dostoevsky were fortunate enough to live in states that had fully adopted Democracy as the (almost) consenus system of choice. It is however a very unique quality of these systems that they, by design, allow for dissent, discussion and other measures of extrapolating one’s viewpoint, openly showing one’s political ambition. Thus, in a lot of cases, new thoughts and concepts (especially those of the social, scientific, artisitic and the ‘minor’ political kind) can be expressed within the legal boundaries set by the states, rendering them very unproblematic indeed when dealing with them.

Thus, we are left with the more interesting cases: A concrete or perceived moral victory that can only be achieved by overstepping boundaries:

In the public court of justice alone we can find numerous examples of people that are almost worshipped for doing just that: Nelson Mandela, Che Guevara, the ‘Edelweisspiraten’ ( A german anti-Hitler resistance group), etc. etc. :

All of them have a history of crime and and conflict with their respective judiciaries, more or less relying on some form of violence or the threat thereof to underscore their goals ,while  none of them were condemned for their actions.

These practical examples should suffice to point out, that extraordinary circumstances and the extraordinary ends sometimes do justify extraordinary means.

However, we are still left with various quandaries when focussing on the actual practical implications of our deductions:

The greatest problem of them all is that criminal measure or a possibly violent course of action can be equated to being a sunk cost: The ‘investment’ in these measures must, by nature, occur at the beginning of the struggle, leaving the actor with no security whatsover concerning the likelihood of the success  of his endeavour.

Furthermore, we can never be entirely be sure that we will indeed receive the benefit of hindsight: Are we going to be redeemed by public opinion? Are we really struggling for a worthy cause? Are we bettering society or merely acting on egoistic motives? Who are we to oversee the madness that might ensue from our actions?

Raskolnikow/Dostoevsky and Nietzsche attempt to solve this dilemma by stating that these questions are not for debate but rather inherently answered in the leader of men, the overstepping of boundaries being the prerogative of the ‘Überhuman’.

I believe we are best served with putting measures in place that will allow for civil dissent, keeping the necessity of violent revolution at least somewhat at bay. After all, how can we be sure that next self-professed leader is another Nelson Mandela and not another Pinochet….

-Daniel P. Neuhann

Sometimes, however, one is also subjected to somewhat strange excrescences of the scientific struggle to find ever new formulas to analyze that same environment.

Hence, le plat du jour:

“Dissecting the Laffer Curve” or “How to shoot to global fame by being the first to ‘discover’ (not so) noteworthy banalities”

The Laffer Curve, named after the American economist Arthur Laffer, advisor to Ronald Reagan, concerns itself with finding the optimal tax rate, maximizing federal tax revenue.

The pillar-stones of the theory are the two outer boundaries, the tax rates 0% and 100%. Given the natural assumption that no investemts will be made at a tax rate of 100%, the simple deduction is that at both rates, there will be zero revenue from taxes.

Laffer, who himself says this work is based on the thoughts of J.M. Keynes, thus rightfully claims that the maximizing tax rate is somewhere in between those two extremes, a theory of very simple and banal nature yet nevertheless right.

So, you may ask, apart from merely being the graphical representation of the common sense inherent in all human beings that might think about the topic of taxes, where does the Laffer-curve err?

In my opinion, the curve neglects the main factors influencing tax revenue:

For example, the assumption that the curve should take on a smooth, concave course is not proven in any form or fashion, making this assumption a completely illegitimate one:

Taxes are not paid by a single homo economicus conducting business in a petri-dish, they are being paid by countless individuals within a world superabundant with contingencies, synergies and untraceable interrelated events.

Ergo, it is illusory to claim a parabolic function can realistically depict tax revenues at various levels, seeing the immeasurable combinations of factors that may lead to various economic decisions by the individual.

To underscore this point, we must look no further than the real or perceived ideological background that different taxation systems might have and the reception of those ideologies by the consciousness of the general public: It is apparent that this alone could have vast effects on the morale of a people, in turn greatly influencing productivity and efficieny of a national economy, in turn affecting tax revenue.

Furthermore, this claim is supported by the fact all markets are hampered by the dilemma of asymmetrical information and the limited view of the individual:

While everybody will know the tax rates for the various income levels of indivuals and more importantly, for the large corporations routinely receiving tax cuts, most will be unaware of national tax revenue figures and and how those figures were reached. This means, that even though total tax revenues might rise when taxes are lowered for certain income levels, such as for the high earners in attempt to keep them within a given entity, possibly benefiting the entire society, this can in fact be perceived as injustice by those not directly benefitting from the tax cuts.

Admittedly, this is totally understandable, seeing that it is nearly impossible to wholesomely analyze an entire national economy, especially for those who don’t occupy themselves with an attempt to do so daily.

Hence, repercussions on the moral constitution of a populace are bound to occur, a fact that shouldn’t be overlooked but is being overlooked by the Laffer-Curve, meaning it is flawed and greatly limited in its applications, in my opinion.

As stated above, it merely provides us with the graphical representation of very simple facts let still leaves the field of taxes to deductions made from assumptions, experiences beliefs and ideological groundwork rather than providing a methodology to hang on to or a set of rules that indeed describe economic behaviour under the influence of different tax rates on more than a superficial level.

Howeeeevverrr, on an important side Note:

While I do not believe that the Laffer-Curve has a lot of useful applications, Laffer himself has shown a far greater understanding of the inner workings of a national economy than I will probably ever achieve , succeeding in devising efficient taxation systems during the period of Reaganomics. Thus, I bow my head to the man in attempt to cover up that useless piece of theory that has become called the ‘Laffer-Curve’

- Daniel P. Neuhann

As a recap for those not versed in the systematic roots of economics, Italian sociologist and economist Pareto stated the following:

Given a set of alternative allocations and a set of individuals, a movement from one allocation to another that can make at least one individual better off, without making any other individual worse off, is called a Pareto improvement or Pareto optimization. An allocation of resources is Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal when no further Pareto improvements can be made.

Furthermore, Utility is a “measure of the relative happiness or satisfaction (gratification) gained by consuming different bundles of goods and services.”

These concepts are widely applied in economics, be it in game theory or when evaluating production decisions of individuals. As example, the concept of division of labour and specialization is loosely based on these notions, as can be illustrated by many scenarios.

For now, we will merely note that an Allocation A with Person X having 25 units of a certain good and Person Y having 60 is theoretically always preferred to an Allocation B with Person X having 20 units of the good and Person Y having 25.

However, we must keep in mind that countless trades and production scenarios ,which in turn can be subject to different professional and/or personal relationships between people, may have played their part in creating the final allocations A and B.

One important assumption implicitly made here is the concept of the homo oeconomicus, the economic ideal of the human being that makes strictly rational decisions and follows through on them.

The classic market failures such as lack of complete information make it hard to believe that this concept is indeed realistic, but this is not a failure within the model itself but rather in its environment, which does not allow it to operate properly.

We, however, are interested in whether this model is inherently feasible: Can the desirability of any given allocation be determined in depth by applying the notions of pareto-efficiency and utility, implying the homo oeconomicus?

(We will not attempt to mathematically dissect the problems of pareto-efficiency, as this has been done in the work of Amartya Sen)

Common sense will tell us that indeed none of us are really thoroughly rational beings but rather subject to emotional influences. But is this really enough to discredit the described models?

Maybe so, as various studies from British Universities on the topic the pursuit of happiness seem to point out:

The general consensus is that the portion of happiness derived from material belongings is not derived from the actual value of the belongings but rather from their relative value.

Going back to our initial example of Allocations A and B, this would consequently mean Person X would NOT prefer A to B, but rather vice-versa. This is clearly not in line with the first conclusion we drew from the classic economic theorems.

Again we ask: Is this simple deduction viable and enough to discredit the utility-models?

The common response is that it is not, for the following reasons:

Especially in the age of Globalisation, we are often dealing with individuals on the other side of the planet and involving thousands of people in the production processes that lead to certain allocations. Person X is therefore coercively unable to observe his relative decrease in wealth, were we to enforce a change from allocations A to B. Following through, he would more than likely welcome his actual increase in the Good.

Seeing that Person Y could in this day and age well be in China, Person X might actually gain happiness, too, as he will analyze his relative wealth in comparison to his neighbour Z, who has not yet been able to strike a deal with a Chinese that will increase his own revenue of the good by 5 units.

In most cases, we believe that this rebuttal of the previous argument is indeed an effective one.

But then, there are those few cases when the disparity in relative wealth in a society become painfully obvious to even those previously oblivious to them.

Sociologists will agree that Individuals, however individualistic they may be, still feel tied into certain social networks, certain groups, certain entities, one of the most powerful uniters being a common plight, a common struggle for a certain goal.

A simple equation is that the more you associate with one group, the less you will associate with another: Keeping self-preservation in the back of our minds, we fraternise with those we identify as our equals. (So as not to sound as a helpless romantic, we will assume this happens out of purely egoistic motives)

Out of these very basic ideas arise those problems that routinely plaster front-pages around the world and dominate public discussion of the moral integrity of the societies and systems we live in: Unhappiness with the way corporate elites pave their way home with pure gold, sucking in monetary compensation for their work that is not in the least even remotely related to the wages received by subordinates.

Through fraternization, we feel this injustice as if it we ourselves were the subject of it, we protest the impossibility of pursuing happiness through relative wealth in line with the relative amount of work we put in, we silently protest pareto-efficiency as the theoretical backbone that attempts to humble and silence our right to object and to criticise.

We cannot understand Home Depot’s Nardelli receiving a compensation bonus of $210 million and neither can we understand Klaus Esser of Mannesmann fame receiving €59million for pushing the price of stock up before being taken over by Vodafone, a pay-off granted to Esser by none other than Esser himself.

Here, we feel the balance of relative wealth tip in the wrong direction, the perceived injustice and moral wrong-doing leading to unhappiness and a lesser view of our own role in society.

It is in these instances, that we have the power and the incentive to judge our own relative wealth to those around the world: Positive souls will be happy to have food to eat and water to drink, unlike many others on this planet, those who look at the glass as being half empty will lament the growing inequality between the elite and their (in)voluntary followers:

Once again, the concept of relativity is one that hinges on the observability of the variables that determine it, a fact only overcome when the differences become so stark that they are visible to the naked eye or when complete information is available.

Whether this is desirable is another question, however we believe that this concept is definitely worth a thought or two.

-Daniel P. Neuhann

“For those who believe in God, most of the big questions are answered.

But for those of us who can’t readily accept the God formula, the big answers don’t remain stone-written. We adjust to new conditions and discoveries. We are pliable. Love need not be a command or faith a dictum. I am my own God. We are here to unlearn the teachings of the church, state, and our educational system. We are here to drink beer. We are here to kill war. We are here to laugh at the odds and live our lives so well that Death will tremble to take us.”

With a poet’s stroke, Charles Bukowski paints a rough relief of his idea of life in general, his “roadmap towards inner peace”, so to say, using Clinton-inspired vocabulary.

Are we here to drink beer or are we here to leave a legacy behind, a legacy in line with our convictions and beliefs of today?

Do we hunch down, faced with those immeasurable odds Bukowski asks us to laugh at or do we do just that: Laugh a cynic’s laugh, despair and scoff at them at once and let improbability be the catalyst for all our efforts?

Do we ask our inner flame to simmer down and exuberate the light of mediocrity so that Death will have no qualms when leading us to the mass grave that is the unknown afterlife? Or do we let the winds of change fuel that same flame with oxygen so that it might die at once or burn the brightest when it survives the first attack?

Do we watch the flame flicker back and forth? Do we start swaying in our convictions, like a reflection of our inner workings? Or do we stand by our beliefs, do we overlook the momentary eruptions of insecurity by keeping the greater goals in view?

Do we make Death suffer when scraping us off the face of the earth? Do we put ourselves out there and watch as our legacy becomes intertwined with the atmosphere, leaving nothing but mortal remains for the Grim Reaper to take home?

It is this the essence of “becoming you own god”, a statement of as little blasphemy as possible.

Much rather, it is the attempt to reach the fork in the road and go straight. It is taking a machete and reclaiming a path that was yours before, before mental pollution and spirtiual corruption sunk in and confined me and you to the highways most trodden. It is fighting fire with fire.

It is the meticulous construction of a new tower of belief, a new set of rules to follow. Your own tower of belief.

It is striving for assertion of self. It is respect for our fellow fighters in the same struggle. It is the belief in collectivism and in yourself.

It is taking the coalition of the willing on a tour through our own microcosm…

Ask yourself:

Do we use our time to kill war, the variable X that stands for all unnecessary suffering? If we can’t, do we still fight for it?

Do we rethink everything that we have been taught? Do we realize that, while every thought has already been thought, different hunches must be applicable with every passing day, every passing day that might change all or nothing in this world?

Do we realize dogmatism will get us nowhere?

Do we live by this understanding?

After going through the motions, can we still believe in God? Believe in him again? Start believing in him? Still not believe in him?

Of course…In the end, we are still just here to drink beer, to make and give love, to wonder aloud about where all of this is taking us…

-Daniel P. Neuhann

Even rarer are the works that combine thorough, relentless logic with a unique attention to every minute detail in their environment and complete understanding of the inner workings of the topic at hand.

“Of War” by Carl von Clausewitz is certainly a stroke of genuis of very unique quality, a work not bound by superficial considerations or social implications, but rather a demonstration of supreme intelligence, vision and reflection.

This is especially obvious when one abstracts from war and watches Clausewitz’s teachings descend on more general planes of existance:

The genius for war is analog to the genius of politics, a great leader of men in war is a great leader of men in any matter and Clausewitz delivers the blueprint for this man. Not stopping short at the easily observable artefacts of outward behaviour or the notion of success as a proxy variable, acknowledging the influence of luck and chance as one of the main co-efficients such success, he delves deep into the realm of the intellectual , spiritual and emotional make-up of the leader, bringing crystal clear solutions to the surface.

While the means might be different in war, these basic and thus profound teachings hold true when evaluating those leading us and those wanting to lead us.

War may however provide the ideal backdrop to conduct this analysis as the philosophy of war is inherently forced to consider all possible directions and implications of human behaviour: In war, all is fair. Analogically, in war, nothing is fair. Thus, in war, everything must be accounted for, every scenario thought through. A man equipped to bring about victory, succesfully handling the immense challenges of warfare is able to perform strategic decisions of equal or lesser magnitude. In this sense, a political crisis, being inherently related to war, is comparable to war.

As implied above, we must however refrain from directly translating the means of war suggested by Clausewitz into political means, seeing that those being led by politicians are to be treated very differently from soldiers, especially in a democracy. Here, the genius of the politican consists in bringing about consensus or compromise with a view towards accomplishing a common goal and not in convincing others to go along with him on his chosen road.

The underlying qualities empowering the leader to achieve this remain the same, though, sufficient proof of Clausewitz’s worth to the world of today and tomorrow.

-Daniel P. Neuhann

So let us build together and be the architects of the castles in the sky floating over our heads in those day in the not-too-distant future

We are Jaap Dekter and Daniel Neuhann, two young Men studying Law, Business and Economics, socialized in what we call the greater European realm of thought.

We believe in taking cues from the past and giving them a twist.

We believe in Enlightenment and deep thought.
We believe that the world is greater than the sum of its parts.

We believe in playing our part, whichever roles and positions that may incur.

We have an urge to be inspired by thinkers, artists, colleagues, fighters in a struggle.

We have an urge to internalize our environment.

We have an urge to externalize our view.

However…

We don’t want to claim superiority.

We want to claim inclusion into the ranks of those that care about the current state and the future of our world.

Let this blog be one of the platforms.

-Daniel P. Neuhann & Jaap Dekter.